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U.S. farm programs are once again under scrutiny as Con-gress gears up to determine 
what to do with the 2007 farm bill. 
The new chair of the House Commit-
tee on Agriculture, Collin Peterson 
from Minnesota, has added a new 
dimension to the discussion with 
his call for adoption of a stand-
ing disaster payment program as a 
permanent part of the farm bill. His 
proposal expands this year’s farm 
bill debate because consideration of 
the merits of a standing disaster pro-
gram will inevitably draw in a dis-
cussion about what to do with the 
crop insurance program. After all, 
as former USDA under secretary J.B. 
Penn pointed out in 2006 testimony 
before the House Subcommittee on 
Agriculture, “One of the overarching 
goals of the crop insurance program 
has been the reduction or elimina-
tion of ad hoc disaster assistance.” 
If Congress moves in the opposite 
direction and passes a permanent 
disaster program, then a major 
policy rationale for a subsidized 
crop insurance program is called 
into question. 
In the past, when ad hoc disas-
ter payments have been authorized, 
farmers who suffer a yield decline 
of greater than 35 percent qualify 
for the payments. The similarity of 
this disaster coverage to current 
crop insurance coverage is readily 
apparent because the most popular 
crop insurance coverage triggers 
payments when yield or revenue de-
Crop Insurance: Inside or Outside the Farm Bill?
clines by 30 percent (see the graph 
above). This similarity raises a 
number of policy questions. Should 
Congress continue to subsidize 
crop insurance coverage if it is go-
ing to give every farmer 65 percent 
disaster assistance coverage? Is 
taxpayer support for disaster pay-
ments more benefi cial to farmers 
than taxpayer support for crop 
insurance? Would farmers still buy 
crop insurance if Congress provid-
ed free disaster coverage as part of 
the farm bill? Is the 35 percent loss 
threshold too high to provide mean-
ingful disaster assistance? If so, 
could current commodity programs 
be changed to work with disaster-
type assistance that could provide 
more meaningful coverage? 
Disaster Assistance versus 
Crop Insurance
Although a standing disaster as-
sistance program has the potential 
to duplicate much of the cover-
age offered by the crop insurance 
program, there are some important 
differences. Many farmers purchase 
revenue insurance policies rather 
than yield insurance policies. Thus, 
crop insurance provides coverage 
against price changes and yield 
losses whereas disaster programs 
typically cover yield declines. In 
addition, crop insurance programs 
allow producers to choose their own 
deductible, whereas past disaster 
programs have a fi xed percent de-
ductible. And most producers buy 
crop insurance at a price level of 100 
percent, which means that losses 
are compensated at 100 percent 
of the crop price rather than at 65 
percent of price, the level used to 
calculate disaster payments. 
But despite these differences, 
65 percent disaster coverage would 
duplicate a signifi cant portion of the 
coverage provided by a 70 percent 
crop insurance policy. That the two 
programs provide duplicate cover-
age is well recognized by Congress; 
consider, for instance, that in years 
Crop insurance coverage levels for program crops in 2006
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when a farmer qualifi es for both a 
crop insurance payment and a disas-
ter payment, the disaster payment is 
capped so that the farmer does not 
receive compensation that exceeds 
the value of a normal crop. The fact 
that producers receive double pay-
ments for crop losses is sometimes 
cited as one of the benefi ts of having 
both disaster payments and crop 
insurance because the combination 
substantially increases total pay-
ments when a loss is severe. 
For most farmers, availability of 
free or subsidized base insurance 
coverage at a 65 or 70 percent cover-
age level provides assurance that 
assistance will be provided when 
a true disaster strikes their crop. 
But does it really make sense to use 
scarce farm bill funding to duplicate 
coverage that is already available 
to farmers? An alternative use of 
funds would be to design a program 
that would complement rather than 
duplicate crop insurance coverage. 
Two examples of complementary 
programs have been developed by 
the National Corn Growers Associa-
tion (NCGA) and American Farmland 
Trust. Before examining these pro-
grams, a basic question that should 
be addressed is whether the current 
public/private provision of insur-
ance coverage through the crop 
insurance program best serves the 
interests of farmers and taxpayers. 
A recent study of the distribution of 
benefi ts from crop insurance pro-
vides some insights.
Farmer Benefi ts versus 
Industry Benefi ts
In a previous Iowa Ag Review article 
(Summer 2006), we reported that 
since 2001, taxpayers have spent 
$15.1 billion supporting the crop in-
surance program. Farmers received 
$8.8 billion of this amount, with 
the $6.3 billion balance being paid 
to crop insurance companies and 
agents to administer the program. 
We pointed out that large underwrit-
ing gains were a major source of 
industry gains. Proponents of the 
program criticized our analysis by 
claiming that the industry takes on a 
portion of possible losses from crop 
insurance policies and that the gains 
they have obtained over the last fi ve 
years is just compensation for the 
risk they divert from taxpayers.
Whether taxpayers would be 
better served taking on this risk 
themselves is an important ques-
tion. The answer depends in part 
on the price that taxpayers pay the 
industry to take on risk. If the price 
is too high, then taxpayers would be 
better served by adopting a stand-
ing disaster program or by reform-
ing commodity programs so that 
payments are triggered by revenue 
declines rather than yield declines. 
Calculating the “price” that 
taxpayers pay for transferring risk 
to the crop insurance industry 
is not a straightforward exercise 
because all possible risk scenarios 
must be considered. In an effort 
to understand how much risk is 
being absorbed by the industry 
and the price that taxpayers are 
paying to lower their exposure, we 
conducted an analysis of Group 
Risk Income Protection (GRIP) in 
Iowa, Illinois, and Indiana for corn 
and soybeans (see CARD Working 
Paper 07-WP 440 by Paulson and 
Babcock, available at www.card.
iastate.edu/ publications). In 2006, 
GRIP was the most popular crop 
insurance product purchased by 
Illinois corn farmers. Because 
GRIP provides coverage against 
either national price declines or 
yield declines at the county level, 
it offers an alternative to current 
commodity programs that provide 
coverage only against price 
declines.
The table on the next page sum-
marizes some results. The average 
insurance payout if every corn and 
soybean producer in Iowa, Illinois, 
and Indiana purchased GRIP would 
be $47.05/acre. This number as-
sumes that each farmer bought the 
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maximum coverage (most do), that 
they bought the Harvest Revenue 
Option (most do), and that insur-
ance prices are $3.75/bu for corn, 
$7.00/bu for soybeans, and price 
volatilities are 27 percent for corn 
and 20 percent for soybeans. 
To obtain the expected payout 
of $47.05, farmers would have to 
pay $27.67, giving them an average 
net benefi t of $19.38 per acre. As 
compensation for taking on risk, 
insurance companies will receive 
an expected payment of $11.50/
acre. Adding in other administra-
tive costs takes the total indus-
try payment to $23.30/acre. Thus, 
under GRIP, 55 percent of taxpayer 
funding fl ows to the insurance in-
dustry, whereas 45 percent fl ows 
to farmers. It is also interesting to 
note that the per acre cost of GRIP 
exceeds the projected cost of any 
of the other commodity programs, 
making crop insurance the costliest 
farm program currently offered.
The Price of Transferring Risk 
to Insurance Companies
Is $11.50 per acre a fair price for the 
risk that taxpayers “sell” to crop in-
surance companies? This is a diffi cult 
question, but we can gain some in-
sight by thinking about the problem 
in terms of odds on a gamble and in 
terms of buying an insurance policy. 
What Are the Odds?
First, let’s look at the costs of risk 
in terms of a gamble. Note that the 
$11.50 “price” that taxpayers pay 
to crop insurance companies is an 
average, not a certain payment. This 
average includes years in which 
companies lose money, thereby 
absorbing some losses that taxpay-
ers would otherwise cover, as well 
as years in which companies make 
money from the program. Possible 
company losses range from $0 to $61 
per acre. The average loss across 
all years in which the companies 
lose money is approximately $23 
per acre. The range of gains is $0 to 
$30 per acre, with an average gain in 
years that companies make money 
also equal to about $23 per acre. If 
the chance of a loss year were equal 
to the chance of a gain year, then 
this would be an even-odds gamble, 
and over the long run taxpayers and 
companies would break even. If the 
odds were even then the average 
payment to crop insurance compa-
nies (that is, the price of risk) would 
be zero. However, we estimate that 
the chance of a gain year is three 
times larger than the chance of a 
loss year. Thus the odds are tilted in 
favor of the crop insurance compa-
nies. In exchange for taking on an 
average loss of $23 one year out of 
four, companies receive $23 three 
years out of four. That is, the fair 
value of this bet is $11.50 in favor of 
the crop insurance companies.
A Taxpayer Insurance Policy
Another way to think about these 
gains and losses is that taxpayers 
buy an insurance policy from crop 
insurance companies. Each year 
taxpayers pay insurance companies 
a premium of $23 per acre. In three 
years out of four, taxpayers do not 
collect, so they lose their premium. 
In one year out of four, taxpayers 
pay their premium but receive an 
insurance payment of $46. Dividing 
the average payment received by 
the premium collected is called the 
“loss ratio.” In this case, the ex-
pected loss ratio is 0.5, meaning that 
taxpayers get back only $0.50 for 
each $1.00 of premium paid. From 
the company’s viewpoint, a $0.50 
average risk brings a $1.00 expected 
return—a 100 percent rate of return. 
To put this rate of return into 
perspective, an alternative approach 
would be for the U.S. government 
to borrow the amount of money 
needed to cover the losses taken on 
by the insurance industry and pay 
an interest rate of 5 percent. This 
loan could be paid off in years of un-
derwriting gains. In the end, taxpay-
ers could do much better than pay a 
price of $11.50 per acre.
Combining Individual 
Insurance Coverage with 
Commodity Programs
With the current high commodity 
prices, the crop insurance program 
now costs more than any other pro-
gram, with most of the costs going 
to provide insurance to the crops 
that also receive commodity pay-
ments: corn, soybeans, wheat, cot-
ton, rice, and grain sorghum. Farm 
groups in major producing states 
are asking themselves whether their 
interests are best served by a pro-
gram in which more than 50 percent 
of program costs are siphoned off to 
pay agents for selling the insurance 
and to companies for taking on a 
portion of risk.
Adoption of a standing disas-
ter program or either of two major 
proposals that farm groups are con-
sidering would dramatically change 
the distribution of benefi ts from 
one that favors the crop insurance 
industry to one that favors farmers. 
A standing disaster program would 
Impact of selling GRIP in the Corn Belt
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Over the last two decades, ur-ban Chinese consumers have dramatically increased their 
consumption of meat, other live-
stock products, and fruits and have 
decreased consumption of grain-
based foods. China’s per capita grain 
consumption declined from 145 kilo-
grams in 1981 to 78 kilograms in 2004 
in urban areas, whereas the per cap-
ita consumption of meats, eggs, and 
aquatic products increased respec-
tively from 20, 5, and 7 kilograms 
in 1981 to 29, 10, and 12 kilograms 
in 2004. As signifi cant changes in 
food consumption patterns in urban 
China are noted, it is natural to ask: 
Are consumer responses to price 
changes and income growth entirely 
responsible for the transformation 
in food consumption in urban China, 
or have consumers in urban China 
changed their preferences for foods? 
Our recent CARD study examined 
the empirical evidence for structural 
change in urban diets in China. The 
study’s fi ndings may be good news 
for U.S. food industries seeking entry 
into the Chinese market.
Changes in China’s Food 
Marketing System
Since 1978, a series of reforms of 
China’s administrative system, agri-
cultural policy, state-owned enter-
prises, investment regulations, fi scal 
and taxation policies, and fi nancial 
system have fueled the growth of 
China’s economy. Among these 
changes, at least three major devel-
opments have signifi cantly affected 
the food marketing chain in China in 
ways that may have prompted con-
Dietary Change in China’s Cities: Empirical Fact or Urban Legend?
sumers to change their preferences 
for various food products.
First, privatization of food pro-
duction, procurement, and market-
ing dramatically increased the quan-
tity and availability of food in urban 
China, creating new consumption 
opportunities. A watershed shift in 
agricultural policy occurred in 1981, 
when China’s government adopted 
a decentralized agricultural produc-
tion system based on household 
units called the household respon-
sibility system (HRS), which dra-
matically increased the amount of 
money a household could keep for 
themselves from expanded produc-
tion. Following the adoption of the 
HRS, China’s agricultural production 
boomed, and the availability of ag-
ricultural produce and food greatly 
increased.
Second, the elimination of food 
rationing in urban areas allowed 
food prices to adjust to market sup-
ply and demand conditions. Allow-
ing prices to clear markets in 1985 
reduced the role of state procure-
ment and sales of agricultural prod-
ucts, especially for non-staple foods. 
Within three years, rationing of the 
15 non-staple foods in urban areas 
was totally eliminated. Rationing 
of grains and edible oils continued 
until 1993. 
Third, the opening of China’s 
food processing and retailing sector 
to foreign direct investment (FDI) 
has facilitated the rapid moderniza-
tion of China’s food processing and 
distribution systems and created an 
environment that fosters food prod-
uct innovation. From 1990 to 1997, 
annual FDI fl ows into China grew 
tenfold. Substantial FDI has been 
targeted at the retail food sector, 
and the 1990s saw supermarkets rise 
to become a leading retail format for 
food products in urban areas. As for-
eign fi rms penetrated Chinese food 
markets, domestic fi rms responded 
by emulating and adapting foreign 
product designs, quality standards, 
and marketing strategies to better 
fi t the tastes of Chinese consumers. 
The result has been an abundance of 
new food products offered in mod-
ern retail formats, which has facili-
tated signifi cant changes in consum-
er shopping behaviors.
Study Findings
The results of tests applied to urban 
food consumption data for the pe-
riod 1981 to 2004 provide a reason-
ably clear picture of changing food 
consumption in China’s cities. First, 
the tests indicated that the early 
1980s and mid- to late 1990s were 
periods of structural change in food 
consumption in urban China. The 
fi rst of these periods corresponds to 
the elimination of rationing for non-
staple foods and the introduction of 
the HRS. From 1980 to 1985, the out-
put of fruits and freshwater aquacul-
ture products in China increased by 
71 and 130 percent, respectively. Sta-
tistical tests show that during this 
same period, preferences shifted in 
favor of fruits and aquaculture prod-
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ucts, increasing per capita consump-
tion of each product by roughly 2 ki-
lograms. These results suggest that 
policy changes associated with the 
abolition of food rationing and de-
velopment of free markets were the 
most important agents of structural 
change in Chinese diets in the 1980s 
and early 1990s.
Second, foods that have long 
played a major role in urban Chinese 
diets did not show strong evidence 
of preference change. In particular, 
changes in grain, pork, and vegetable 
consumption can be largely ex-
plained by normal price and income 
effects. In contrast, fruits, fi sh, beef, 
and poultry products, while not ab-
sent from traditional Chinese diets, 
play a less important role in daily 
food consumption and were frequent-
ly identifi ed in the tests as showing 
evidence of structural change. The 
increasing consumption of these 
foods may be evidence that local 
and regional diets are broadening to 
include goods that are part of a more 
diverse national diet. An important 
observation supporting this notion 
is the fact that structural change as-
sociated with these products occurs 
in the latter half of the 1990s. This pe-
riod coincides with the rapid devel-
opment of private retail food chains 
and the creation of more regional and 
national food markets. 
Third, the analysis indicates that 
the greatest changes in preferences 
occurred in consumers’ responses 
to price changes. In particular, con-
sumer demands became less respon-
sive to price changes. As incomes 
have risen, food choices have in-
creased and consumers’ food prepa-
ration and shopping behaviors have 
begun to change. Consequently, 
product attributes other than prices, 
such as quality, convenience, and 
food safety, may be playing a greater 
role in consumption decisions. 
Implications for U.S. 
Food Industries
From the perspective of U.S. food 
industries, China’s food product 
markets have been limited by low 
consumer incomes and tastes for  
locally produced products. Our 
study suggests that these con-
straints are loosening, and pros-
pects for U.S. food products are 
improving. The growing sophistica-
tion of Chinese consumers, greater 
openness to new products, and 
the declining responsiveness to 
prices may suggest that U.S. beef, 
pork, and poultry industries will 
see greater opportunities to ex-
pand sales of higher-valued prod-
ucts than in the previous decade. 
The continued improvements in 
China’s cold chain, especially with 
the growing distribution networks 
of large supermarket chains, in-
crease the capacity for U.S. meat 
products to retain their quality until 
they reach consumers. Moreover, 
greater numbers of households are 
willing and able to pay for the qual-
ity, convenience, and safety of U.S. 
products. China still has a long way 
to go in its transition from a market 
for low-value cuts and variety meats 
to a market for high-value cuts, but 
the stage is set for change.
China has experienced tremen-
dous foreign direct investment and 
rapid dietary changes facilitated by 
an evolution in its food marketing 
system. These adjustments point to 
the importance of discovering and 
targeting the product characteristics 
most valued by Chinese consumers. 
As in Japan and Korea, Chinese con-
sumers are becoming increasingly 
sensitive to food safety and consis-
tent quality. Nevertheless, the ability 
for products to adapt to the tradi-
tional Chinese cuisine is still impor-
tant. U.S. food companies that are 
able to successfully target the food 
product attributes desired by urban 
Chinese consumers will tap into a 
huge and growing market. While this 
is certainly a tall order, the observed 
changes in Chinese consumer prefer-
ences indicate that the barriers to 
entry are declining.
Learn More
The study cited in this article is 
described in detail in “Changing Di-
ets in China’s Cities: Empirical Fact 
or Urban Legend?” CARD Working 
Paper 06-WP 437, available at www.
card.iastate.edu/publications. ◆
U.S. food companies 
that are able to 
successfully target the 
food product attributes 
desired by urban 
Chinese consumers will 
tap into a huge and 
growing market.
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Two ethanol plants are explor-ing the possibilities of linkages between ethanol and livestock 
production. The E3 BioFuels plant 
in Mead, Nebraska, and the Panda 
Ethanol plant in Hereford, Texas, are 
trying to take advantage of the syner-
gies between ethanol and livestock 
production. These two plants are 
also testing whether cost advantages 
in ethanol production still exist for 
the Midwest or whether there may be 
advantages in locating ethanol pro-
duction closer to end users for both 
ethanol and ethanol by-products, 
specifi cally distillers grains. 
Corn and Cattle: 
Two Plants’ Advantages
The E3 BioFuels plant is on the verge 
of starting production as of this 
writing. The plant is co-located with 
a 30,000-head cattle feedlot. This 
co-location determined the size of 
the ethanol plant. The 24-million-
gallon-per-year plant is designed to 
be powered by biogas derived from 
the 228,000 tons of manure annually 
produced at the feedlot. The feedlot 
has a slatted fl oor system that allows 
the manure from the cattle to be cap-
tured and processed in two 4-million-
gallon digesters. Power is also saved 
because the distillers grains from the 
ethanol production process are not 
dried; wet distillers grains will be fed 
directly to the cattle in the feedlot. In 
addition, thin stillage, another etha-
nol co-product, will be fed into the 
digesters to help maintain digester 
temperatures without the use of 
natural gas. In this closed-loop sys-
tem between ethanol and livestock, 
output from each component can be 
used as input for the other. In fact, 
the end product from the digester 
can be used as fertilizer, providing an 
additional linkage to the corn used in 
the production scheme. 
Panda Ethanol is expected to 
come online in the latter half of 
2007. Like the E3 BioFuels plant, 
the Panda plant will use manure 
as a power source. With the Panda 
plant’s location in the middle of 
Texas cattle country, manure is in 
steady supply. The 100-million-gal-
lon-per-year plant will also create 
900,000 tons of wet distillers grains 
to be fed to local cattle. Both plants 
take advantage of two key factors: 
the ability to use cattle manure as 
an energy source for the ethanol 
plant and the ability to feed wet 
distillers grains to the cattle. Both 
factors contribute to cost savings 
in plant operation and should allow 
the plants to be highly competitive 
in the ethanol industry. But these 
two plants do highlight a question 
about the ethanol industry and its 
relationship with livestock: does it 
make more economic sense to place 
the ethanol plant where livestock 
currently are or to move the live-
stock and the ethanol plant close to 
where the corn is grown? Historical-
ly, the ethanol industry has located 
plants in areas of inexpensive corn 
and has not taken advantage of 
livestock synergies. The E3 BioFu-
els and Panda plants show that the 
ethanol industry is evolving to cap-
ture other cost advantages.
Modeling Three Scenarios
To examine this question, we have 
constructed a simple economic 
model of a 50-million-gallon-per-year 
ethanol plant, accounting for capital, 
operating, and transportation costs 
for the plant. The plant yields 2.75 
gallons of ethanol and 17 pounds of 
dried distillers grains per bushel of 
corn. We use recent prices of $135 
per ton for dried distillers grains, 
$39 per ton for wet distillers grains, 
$2.00 per gallon for ethanol, and 
$3.63 per bushel for corn to calcu-
late the revenues and feedstock 
costs for the plant. We allow operat-
ing costs to shift based on whether 
the plant dries its distillers grains 
or not. We assume that drying costs 
make up 50 percent of the plant’s 
energy costs or roughly 25 percent 
of total operating costs. We have 
also gathered railroad and truck-
ing transportation cost information 
to compute transportation costs at 
various plant locations and dis-
tances to markets. We examine three 
scenarios involving two prototype 
plants located near corn in Iowa and 
one plant located near cattle in Tex-
as. For the Texas plant, we assume 
that all distillers grains are fed wet 
to cattle within a 50-mile radius, all 
corn is railed in from Iowa 900 miles 
away, and the ethanol is shipped 100 
miles to reach its market. For both 
Iowa plants, we assume the ethanol 
is shipped 1,000 miles to reach its 
market, half of the distillers grains 
are fed locally (average distance 
of 50 miles), and half of the distill-
ers grains are dried and shipped 
900 miles to Texas. For one of the 
Iowa plants, we assume the locally 
consumed distillers grains are dried 
(dry DG). For the other, we assume 
the local distillers grains are wet 
(wet DG). These scenarios allow us 
to examine the impact of wet versus 
dry distillers grains and transporta-
tion costs at the same time.
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Linkages Key to Competitiveness
The top fi ve lines of the table above 
outline the costs per bushel of corn 
each plant faces. The Texas plant 
would have a $0.20 operating cost 
advantage over the Iowa plant that 
ships wet DG and a $0.39 operating 
cost advantage over the Iowa plant 
that ships dry DG. These operating 
cost advantages refl ect the drying 
costs at each plant. The Iowa plants 
make up some of the cost difference 
through transportation, as the cost 
per bushel of moving the corn is 
higher than that of moving the etha-
nol and the distillers grains. The Iowa 
plants have a $0.22 to $0.25 transpor-
tation cost advantage. The lower half 
of the table shows the revenues for 
the plants and their margins, the dif-
ference between revenues and costs. 
Given our ethanol price assumption, 
all three plants have ethanol rev-
enues of $5.50 per bushel of corn. 
The distillers grains revenues dif-
fer across plants, depending on the 
percentage of distillers grains sold 
wet versus dry. Because the price 
of the dry DG is well above that of 
the wet, the Iowa plants derive more 
revenue from distillers grains than 
does the Texas plant. When the costs 
and revenues are combined, the Iowa 
plant selling wet DG has the highest 
margin, earning $0.35 per bushel of 
corn, followed by the Texas plant and 
then the Iowa plant selling dry DG. 
However, these results are dependent 
on the transportation cost assump-
tions and the percentage of distill-
ers grains fed wet versus dry for the 
Iowa plants. For example, if the Iowa 
plant with wet DG can sell only 20 
percent of distillers grains wet, then 
its margin drops below the Texas 
plant. If the Iowa plant with dry DG 
can sell all of its distillers grains with-
in 250 miles of the plant, then that 
plant’s margin will exceed the margin 
for the Texas plant. Clearly, opportu-
nities provided by linkages with the 
livestock industry will determine the 
relative competitiveness of the differ-
ent locations. It is also worth noting 
that the relative cost advantages will 
change with variations in the relative 
transportation cost of the different 
products and co-products. 
These results show that Iowa 
ethanol plants will need to develop 
stronger linkages to the livestock 
industry to maintain their competi-
tive edge. The ability to feed wet DG 
to cattle provides the Texas plant 
in our example a sizable operat-
ing cost advantage. The building of 
the E3 Biofuels and Panda Ethanol 
plants indicates that this advantage 
has attracted some ethanol inves-
tors. If Iowa ethanol plants can 
establish sizable feed shipments 
for wet DG for dairy and beef cattle 
or dry DG for hogs and poultry in 
the state, then Iowa plants can also 
capture signifi cant operating and 
transportation cost advantages. ◆ 
Ethanol plant costs and revenues
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The continuing strong expansion of the etha-nol industry has raised questions about the availability and price of corn over the next 
few years. Will Corn Belt states continue to produce 
enough surplus corn to meet all the traditional 
users in other states and in the rest of the world? 
Based on ethanol industry announcements, the 
United States could have up to 12 billion gallons 
of ethanol production capacity during the 2008/09 
crop year. With a typical ethanol conversion rate of 
2.75 gallons of ethanol per bushel of corn, 12 billion 
gallons of ethanol translates into 4.4 billion bushels 
of corn. To see how the expansion of the ethanol in-
dustry is changing the flow of corn across the Unit-
ed States, we have estimated state-level domestic 
surplus corn, which is the amount of corn remain-
ing in a state after accounting for ethanol, livestock 
feed, and other processing in the state. To do that, 
we estimated corn usage for ethanol and livestock 
feed by state and combined those estimates with 
figures on corn processing for non-ethanol purpos-
es from ProExporter and corn production numbers 
from USDA. Domestic surplus corn is corn that is 
either maintained in stocks or available for export 
to other states or countries. We estimated domestic 
surplus corn for 2004 and for a projection of 2008.
Corn Utilization and Surpluses for 2004
The graph below shows domestic surplus corn esti-
mates for the two years. This graph also shows that 
the ethanol industry is having and will continue to 
have a major impact on U.S. corn utilization and 
sourcing. The 2004 crop year was a record breaker 
for corn. The U.S. produced 11.8 billion bushels of 
corn. Domestic livestock consumed over 6 billion 
bushels of that crop. Ethanol captured over 1 bil-
lion bushels, and other corn processing took over 
1 billion bushels as well. That left roughly 3 billion 
bushels of domestic surplus corn for exports and 
stocks. As the blue bars show, the surplus corn 
came from the upper Midwest. Sixteen states pro-
duced more corn than they used. Illinois had the 
Domestic surplus corn in the Midwest
?
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directly transfer a large portion of 
the risk currently taken on by the 
crop insurance industry directly to 
U.S. taxpayers, thereby lowering both 
underwriting gains and other costs 
of running the program. A proposal 
being considered by the NCGA would 
replace marketing loans and coun-
tercyclical payments with a target 
revenue program at the county level 
that would also transfer a signifi cant 
amount of risk away from the crop in-
surance program. Most of the remain-
ing risk would be transferred with 
the second part of the NCGA pro-
gram, which would provide coverage 
against individual losses. The Ameri-
can Farmland Trust has proposed 
something similar. Its proposal would 
create a target revenue program at 
the national level that would take a 
signifi cant amount of risk away from 
the crop insurance program, espe-
cially in major production regions. 
The remaining residual risk would be 
covered by a modifi ed crop insur-
ance program that would deduct 
payments made by the national pro-
gram from individual losses before an 
insurance claim is settled. 
Any of these modifi cations of 
current farm policy would signifi -
cantly shift tax support away from 
the crop insurance industry to 
direct support of farm income. If 
Congress ultimately concludes that 
its efforts to wean agriculture away 
from disaster assistance programs 
through an expanded crop insur-
ance program have failed, then 
some combination of these three 
proposed new approaches would 
seem to offer a viable, cost-effec-
tive alternative. Combining bottom-
up base coverage at the individual 
farmer level with top-down cover-
age of a target revenue program is 
one alternative. The bottom-up cov-
erage could be in the form of the so-
called wrap coverage proposed by 
American Farmland Trust, a stand-
ing disaster program, as proposed 
by Congressman Peterson, or the 
NCGA’s individual revenue insur-
ance program. ◆ 
Crop Insurance
Continued from page 3
most surplus corn, at 1.4 billion 
bushels, but Iowa, Minnesota, In-
diana, and Nebraska all had over 
500 million bushels of surplus 
corn each.
Corn Utilization and Surpluses for 
Projected 2008
For 2008, we have assumed that 
the U.S. produces 12.6 billion 
bushels, based on trend yields and 
an increase in U.S. corn planting to 
around 89 million acres. We held 
state-level livestock feeding and 
other corn processing constant 
at 2004 levels but allowed state-
level corn usage for ethanol to 
shift, reflecting the ongoing con-
struction in the ethanol industry. 
We assumed that all of the plants 
listed on the CARD ethanol plants 
Web page (http://www.card.iastate.
edu/research/bio/tools/ethanol.
aspx) would be in production dur-
ing the 2008/09 crop year. Because 
the plants under construction are 
concentrated in a few regions of 
the country, ethanol’s expansion 
will shift the location of domestic 
surplus and how much is available. 
Given our assumptions, nationwide 
there would be a total of just over 
800 million bushels of domestic 
surplus corn available for export 
to other countries or to place in 
stocks. The acreage increase is not 
enough to offset completely the 
combination of a return to trend 
yields and the expansion of ethanol. 
Fifteen states produce more corn 
than they use. Wisconsin changes 
from a net exporter of corn to a net 
importer. Illinois holds fi rm at 1.4 
billion bushels of surplus corn, but 
other midwestern states experience 
sizable drops in surplus corn. Iowa 
falls from second to third in surplus 
corn, as the state will have only 400 
million bushels left after accounting 
for in-state uses. Nebraska and In-
diana also have signifi cant drops in 
surplus corn. Nebraska’s domestic 
surplus corn falls 400 million bush-
els from 2004 levels; Indiana’s drops 
200 million. Corn importing states, 
such as Kansas and Texas, increase 
their use of corn to fuel their new 
ethanol plants as well. The expan-
sion of the ethanol industry could 
have dramatic effects on the U.S. 
corn sector and on the other uses 
for U.S. corn. If sizable declines in 
surplus corn in Iowa, Nebraska, and 
Indiana occur, it should translate 
into higher corn prices within those 
states. Illinois and Minnesota, with 
their relatively stable supplies of 
surplus corn, stand to be the tar-
gets for states and countries look-
ing for sources of cheaper corn. ◆
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Japanese consumers are among the world’s most demanding in their expectations for safety, 
quality, taste, and value in the food 
products they purchase. Remind-
ing these consumers that U.S. beef 
meets all these criteria and rebuild-
ing demand after a two-and-a-half-
year absence from the market will 
require careful marketing, safety 
assurances, rebuilding of trade 
relationships—and adequate sup-
plies. In the months following the 
reopening of the Japanese market to 
U.S. beef, importers were expressing 
frustration that they were unable to 
obtain enough U.S. beef to meet de-
mand, even at the very low volumes 
needed for a slowly expanding, very 
cautious market.
The shortage of eligible beef 
caught some industry participants 
by surprise. Following the December 
2003 ban on U.S. beef, the Japa-
nese government conducted their 
side of negotiations to reopen their 
market to U.S. beef in a politically 
charged environment under strong 
criticism from political opponents, 
the Japanese media, and consumer 
groups. Numerous surveys were 
published indicating that the major-
ity of Japanese consumers would 
be unwilling to purchase U.S. beef 
when it re-entered the market. Nega-
tive reports about the safety of U.S. 
beef and the U.S. export verifi ca-
tion system gained steam when the 
market was reopened only briefl y 
before banned materials were found 
in a shipment of U.S. veal. It took an-
other six months of negotiations and 
inspection of U.S. plants by Japanese 
offi cials before the market again 
reopened on July 26, 2006. Given the 
negative political and media mes-
sages questioning the safety of U.S. 
beef, it is not surprising that Japa-
After the Ban: U.S. Beef Exports to Japan Lag Demand
nese consumers expressed caution 
in surveys about purchasing U.S. 
beef and that most supermarkets 
did not immediately stock U.S. beef 
for sale.
A Return of Confi dence—
and Demand
Once U.S. beef began to reach 
Japanese consumers, however, the 
Japanese media switched its focus 
and began reporting on examples 
of strong acceptance of U.S. beef 
by some consumers. Costco and 
Zenshoku Co. received wide cover-
age for being the fi rst supermarket 
and restaurant chain, respectively, 
to offer U.S. beef following the ban. 
On September 18, Yoshinoya D&C 
Co. sold one million servings of 
gyudon (“beef bowl”) made with 
U.S. beef in just 10 hours. Newspa-
pers reported that customers had 
waited in long lines for the Yoshi-
noya restaurants to open. These 
early reports of consumer confi -
dence in U.S. beef were support-
ed by results from taste tests in 
Japanese supermarkets and other 
venues where Japanese consumers 
eagerly sampled U.S. beef.
These initial successes were 
important signals to many Japanese 
consumers who were waiting to see 
what other consumers would do, 
and to the Japanese restaurateurs 
and retailers who were waiting to 
see whether their customers would 
accept U.S. beef. The successes also 
revealed that Japanese importers 
wanted more U.S. beef than was be-
ing supplied.
From August through November 
2006, the United States exported 
8,825 metric tons of beef to Japan. 
The total volume that might have 
been exported if the supply of 
eligible beef had been unlimited is 
unknown, but more beef could have 
been shipped. Japanese importers 
who began purchasing beef imme-
diately after the ban was lifted in 
July were unable to obtain enough, 
and importers who waited to 
judge consumer acceptance found 
themselves struggling to fi ll sup-
ply chains. The shortage of eligible 
U.S. beef was attributed to a lack of 
U.S. fed cattle with documented age 
verifi cation.
Restrictions Narrow the Funnel
Current Japanese restrictions require 
that U.S. beef be harvested from ani-
mals 20 months of age or younger at 
the time of slaughter. Age can be veri-
fi ed by enrolling calves in a USDA-ap-
proved Quality System Assessment 
(QSA) program or Process Verifi ed 
Program, or cattle can be determined 
to be A40 physiological maturity or 
younger through an offi cial USDA 
evaluation using the U.S. Standards 
for Carcass Beef and the description 
of maturity characteristics within A 
maturity. In a 2005 study to deter-
mine the relationship between chron-
ological and physiological age of U.S. 
fed beef, USDA estimated that the 
mean age of U.S. fed cattle at harvest 
was about 16 to 17 months of age and 
Thus, although 
the United States is 
producing vast 
quantities of the age 
and type of beef 
demanded by the
 Japanese market, 
Japanese importers have 
been unable to source 
enough eligible beef.
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that 97 percent of U.S. fed cattle were 
being harvested before 20 months of 
age. However, only about 5 percent 
of U.S. fed cattle had documentation 
proving chronological age. The study 
also found that an A40 maturity score 
for U.S. carcasses ensures the beef is 
harvested from an animal 20 months 
of age or younger, but the A40 score 
is such a conservative measure of 
physiological age that less than 8 per-
cent of the cattle in the USDA dataset 
produced carcasses with a maturity 
score of A40 or younger. Thus, at the 
time of the study, the U.S. industry 
had a low volume of carcasses that 
would potentially qualify for Japan 
under either method.
Other factors further reduced 
the volume of eligible beef. Japan in-
spected and approved U.S. packing 
facilities to export beef. Not all quali-
fi ed cattle were being harvested at 
one of the 34 packing facilities ap-
proved to export beef to Japan, and 
not all the approved facilities were 
exporting beef to Japan immediately 
after U.S. beef was allowed to enter 
Japan. Industry experts estimated 
that around 3 percent of U.S. beef 
could potentially qualify for export 
to Japan when U.S. beef was allowed 
re-entry into Japan in July 2006. 
Thus, although the United States is 
producing vast quantities of the age 
and type of beef demanded by the 
Japanese market, Japanese import-
ers have been unable to source 
enough eligible beef.
Ramping Up Eligibility
The percentage of U.S. cattle that can 
achieve A40 maturity scores would be 
expected to show little variation, but 
producers can control the number 
of cattle enrolled in an approved age 
verifi cation program. In 2007, more 
beef should become available as 
higher numbers of animals enrolled 
in approved QSA or Process Verifi ed 
Programs become ready for harvest, 
and it will be important for the U.S. 
industry to continue to provide a 
large stream of documented animals 
indefi nitely. As the fi rst six-month 
verifi cation period for the U.S. ex-
port verifi cation program for beef to 
Japan neared an end, the Japanese 
government declined a USDA request 
to engage in discussions about rais-
ing the age limit of cattle from which 
beef can be harvested. The Japanese 
All Japanese cattle are source and 
age verifi ed from birth using ear 
tags with a unique 10-digit animal 
identifi cation code.
Japanese importers seeking to assure buyers and end-users about the safe-
ty of imported beef prefer documented 
age verifi cation programs because 
they provide a story about how the 
beef was produced. Such information 
is a valuable consumer assurance tool 
in Japan, where consumers can obtain 
the production history of domestic cat-
tle from the birth of the source animal 
through sale of individual beef cuts in 
the supermarket meat case. Under the 
mandatory cattle identifi cation system 
operated by the government, produc-
ers double-tag each animal with a 
unique 10-digit ID number at birth. 
Producers then fax specifi c “event” 
information for each animal to gov-
ernment offi ces, where the data are 
entered into a database. The ID num-
ber can be used to view production 
government indicated that it will 
conduct a second audit, confi rm the 
audit results, and make the results 
public before considering changes 
to the current system. It is likely that 
discussions about age eventually will 
take place, but if the negotiations 
over reopening the market serve 
as an indication, considerable time 
could elapse before changes are actu-
ally implemented.
Another advantage of using doc-
umented age verifi cation programs 
is that Japanese importers seeking 
to assure their buyers and end-users 
about the safety of U.S. beef prefer 
this form of verifi cation because 
“there is no story with A40 beef.” The 
story about how and where meat is 
produced is an important market-
ing tool in Japan and will continue 
to be important even if the age limit 
for U.S. cattle is increased or lifted. 
Further, the ability to provide only 
specifi c cuts to Japan will continue 
to be a major advantage for the 
U.S. industry. To meet these prefer-
ences for documentation and cuts as 
demand increases in Japan, the U.S. 
industry will need to increase its 
production of eligible beef. ◆
information via the Internet at any time 
during the animal’s life and is labeled 
on meat sold in supermarkets. Using the 
number, producers and consumers can 
obtain such information as the animal’s 
birth date, sex, breed, place of birth, calf 
producer’s name, dates of movements 
to different facilities, and harvest date. 
Cellular phones with Internet access ca-
pabilities have increased the accessibil-
ity of the database because a computer 
is no longer required to view the data. 
The Japanese system sets a high standard 
that would not be cost-effective for many 
foreign suppliers to try to match. How-
ever, importers indicate that documented 
age and source verifi cation, even with-
out full traceability, is far preferable to 
physiological age determination as U.S. 
beef attempts to regain a foothold in the 
Japanese market.
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